# Pandemic and other emerging threats from animal and human influenza

### Ian Barr

Deputy Director

WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and

Research on Influenza

www.influenzacentre.org



The Melbourne WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza is supported by the Australian Government Department of Health











# Influenza Ecology



Type B


2 lineages "Human" virus



Type C




No subtypes Limited hosts Mild disease



Type D




No subtypes Limited hosts ?infect man



### The influenza virus

### **Electron micrograph**



Note: Influenza viruses-

Have a segmented genome (8 seg., 13Kb)

Coding for approx. 12 proteins


No proof-reading during replication

1 error each new virion made


2 major surface glycoproteins

Haemagglutnin (HA), Neuraminidase (NA)


### **Schematic**




### Influenza A is a zoonotic disease with many possible hosts




Central host are Water fowl eg. ducks, 16 Influenza A HA subtypes; most infections occur in GI tract and do not affect birds health, 2 subtypes in bats



Swine Densities (1 billion)



### Birds travel on the wing and on bike!












# And pigs really DO fly!

### Live swine trade routes



Trade value of live swine, 1996-2012, \$mil

> 1000 100-1000 10-99

**UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database** 

# Avian influenza outbreaks in birds reported to FAO 2014-2016

H7N9 LPAI Outbreak Events- Observation date from 01/08/2014 to 01/08/2016, China

**H5Nx HPAI** 

H7N9 LPAI



April 1 2013

H7N9



June 22 2013

**H6N1** 

H7N9 avian flu



admitted to hospital on May 8 with a

transmission had been detected.

The nations a 20 year-old woman who worked at a breakfast shop in

June 27 2013

H3N2v



### China reports first H10N8 avian flu death

By Madison Park, CNN

December 18, 2013 -- Updated 1336 GMT (2136 HKT)

SHARE THIS













More sharing



Chickens are seen at a poultry farm in China.

#### STORY HIGHLIGHTS

- · A 73-year-old woman, confirmed to have H10N8 avian flu virus, died
- . Woman was from China and suffered several underlying diseases
- · Chinese health authorities: Risk of human infection is low
- . H7N9 outbreak said to pose greater risk to public health

Hong Kong (CNN) -- An elderly woman infected with a strain of avian flu that is rarely seen in humans died in China earlier this month -- marking the first human fatality from the H10N8 virus.

The 73-year-old woman in Jiangxi province was admitted to a hospital on November 30, suffering from several ailments including severe pneumonia, hypertension, heart disease and a muscular weakness condition. She died on December 6.

The woman had a history of contact with live poultry markets, and



Part of complete coverage on

China

#### People power in the People's Republic

June 26, 2014 -- Updated 0836 GMT (1636 HKT)



CNN's Kristie Lu Stout invites Isaac Mao, Han Dongfang, and of civil society in China and social media's crucial role

#### China's controversial philanthropist



Chen Guangbiao wants rich

Dec 18 2013

H10N8







Dec 30 2013

H9N2



Jan 8 2014 H5N1




May 9 2014

**H5N6** 



May 2016

HPAI H7N9



Dec 2017

**H7N4** 

### Outcomes from these zoonotic infections

### Outcomes from H5N1 human cases

- Since 2003; 860 cases detected, 454 deaths; HFR 53%
- But in 2017; 4 cases with 2 deaths; 2018 (up to March) 0 cases

### Outcomes from H7N9 (Chinese) human cases

- Since 2013 a total of 1565 cases with 620 deaths (HFR 39%)
- 5<sup>th</sup> wave 2016-7 766 cases (incl. HPAI); 6<sup>th</sup> wave 2017-8 only 3 cases reported, ?deaths

### Outcomes from other isolated human avian influenza infections

- H6N1, single case, hospitalized, recovered, no evidence of person-person transmission
- H10N8, 3 cases, 2 deaths, no evidence of transmission
- H9N2, several cases, few hospitalized, recovered, no evidence of person-person transmission
- H5N6, 17 cases (1 in 2017) all in China, 11 deaths, no evidence of person-person transmission

### Outcomes from other isolated human swine (variant) influenza infections

- In US 468 cases since 2005, small number of hospitalizations and 1 death
- Other isolated human cases in several countries eg. Switzerland 2017; mild disease

# Clinical syndromes in human infections of novel subtypes of influenza A viruses


	LPAI viruses Avian source	HPAI viruses	Swine source Variant viruses*
Conjunctivitis	H7N2, H7N3, H7N7, H10N7	H7N3, H7N7	H1N1v, H3N2v
Upper respiratory tract illness	H6N1, H7N2, H7N3, H7N9, H9N2, H10N7	H5N1, H5N6, H7N7	H1N1v, H1N2v, H3N2v
Lower respiratory tract disease, pneumonia	H7N2, H7N9, H9N2, H10N8	H5N1, H5N6, H7N7, H7N9	H1N1v, H3N2v
Respiratory failure, acute respiratory distress syndrome	H7N9, H10N8	H5N1, H5N6, H7N7, H7N9	H1N1v, H3N2v
Multiorgan failure	H7N9, H10N8	H5N1, H5N6, H7N7, H7N9	
Encephalopathy or encephalitis	H7N9	H5N1	-1.
Fatal outcomes†	H7N9, H9N2, H10N8	H5N1, H5N6, H7N7, H7N9	H1N1v, H3N2v

Uyeki T et al. Lancet 2017


\*Variant viruses of swine origin

†High mortality in reported cases: about 40% for LPAI H7N9, about 50% for HPAI H5N1, and about 70% for HPAI H5N6.

# U.S. Human nfections with Variant swine influenza Viruses by State (since December 2005)



# Age dependent serum antibody levels to A/Minnesota/11/2010 H3N2v of Australians by MN titre (sera sampled end 2011)



Data generated by Karen Laurie @ WHO CC Melbourne

### Swine influenza in Australia

Apart from incidental H1N1pdm infections, Australian swine thought to be influenza free 2 outbreaks detected in July/August 2012 in pigs in Western Australia and Queensland

Virus	Gene Segment								
Virus Source subtype	PB2	PB1	PA	НА	NP	NA	MP	NS	
H1N2*	WA pigs								
H3N2*	WA pigs								
H1N2*	Qld pigs								
H1N2	Qld pigs								
H1N1pdm	Qld pigs								


H1N1pdm (post 2009

Human H1N1 (~1983-96)

Human H3N2 (~1970-2003)

### Ferret contact transmission model


- Infect donors intranasally
- ❖ 24 hr's post infection, naïve ferret is placed in the same cage
- ightharpoonup Transmission from donor to recipient ferret measured (RT-PCR + TCID<sub>50</sub>)
- ❖ Actually a combination between contact/aerosol transmission




#### **Work performed by Chantal Baas**

- •Hurt et al, 2010 J Virol 84(18): 9427-9438
- Laurie et al, 2010 J Infect Dis 202(7):1011-1020

# Australian swine H1 & H3 viruses readily transmit & replicate in ferret contact model (C. Baas)






### Can we learn from past influenza pandemics?









1918: "Spanish Flu"

40 to 50 million deaths

A(H1N1)

CFR 2-3%

Original source: ?

1957: "Asian Flu"

1 to 4 million deaths

A(H2N2)

CFR < 0.2%

Original source: ?

1968: "Hong Kong Flu"

1 to 4 million deaths

A(H3N2)

1977

<0.1 million deaths


2009: "Swine Flu"

A(H1N1)swl

CFR <0.2% Re-emergence CFR <0.005% of A(H1N1)

Original source: ? Original source: swine?

# How did the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 arise? No swine H1N1pdm09 virus; phylogenetic reconstruction only!



### IRAT (CDC) and TIPRA (WHO)

- IRAT (Influenza Risk Assessment Tool) for pandemic preparedness
  - Developed by US CDC (began 18-19 October 2011)
  - CANNOT predict a future pandemic
  - Intended to prioritize and maximize investments in pandemic preparedness by helping to determine which novel (new) influenza viruses to develop vaccines
  - Identify key gaps in information and knowledge which can be the basis to prompt additional studies
  - Document in a transparent manner the data and scientific process used to inform management decisions associated with pandemic preparedness
  - Provide a flexible means to easily and regularly update the risk assessment of novel influenza viruses as new information becomes available
  - Be an effective communications tool for policy makers/influenza community
  - Be a measure (by using 10 scientific criteria) of the ability of an influenza virus to "emerge" as a pandemic capable virus (i.e., become capable of efficient human-to-human spread) or "impact" the human population if it did emerge

### The 10 evaluation criteria of IRAT

### **Properties of the Virus**

- 1. **Genomic variation** is a measure of the extent of genetic diversity or presence of known molecular signatures important for human infections and disease.
- 2. **Receptor binding** refers to the host preference (e.g., animal or human) of an influenza virus as well as the types of tissues and cells the virus is best suited to infecting (e.g., nose tissue and cells vs. deep lung tissue and cells
- 3. **Transmission in lab animals** is a measure of the ability of an influenza virus to transmit efficiently in animals in laboratory studies (transmit through the air via small infectious droplets /direct contact with an infected host)
- 4. **Antiviral treatment susceptibility/resistance** is a measure of how well an influenza virus responds to treatment with influenza antiviral drugs, such as oseltamivir, zanamivir and M2 blockers.

### **Attributes of the Population**

- 5. **Existing population immunity** does the human population has any existing immune protection against the novel influenza virus being evaluated. Susceptibility/severity may depend on age, geographic area, or genetic factors
- 6. **Disease severity and pathogenesis** measures the severity of illness caused by a particular influenza virus in people and/or animals.
- 7. **Antigenic relationship to vaccine candidates** is a measure of how similar a novel influenza virus is when compared to a current or previously manufactured influenza vaccine strain.

### **Ecology and Epidemiology**

- 8. **Global distribution (animals)** measures of how widespread an influenza virus is in animals. For example, is the virus found in animals in a limited area or is it found in animals from many different areas?
- 9. **Infection in animal species** refers to what kinds of animals are impacted by the influenza virus and the likelihood of human contact with these animals. For example, are influenza infections occurring in wild birds or domestic birds?
- 10. **Human Infections** are human infections with a novel influenza virus are occurring. If so, how? Eg Has human-to-human transmission or clusters of disease occurred? or how frequently/easily does transmission occur after direct/prolonged contact between humans/ infected animals?

# Information on H7N4 case provided by CNIC on 15.2.2018

(original H7N4 diagnosis by Jiangsu Provincial CDC)

58y female farmer from Jiangsu province, developed cough on 25/12/2017, local clinic 27/12/2017, County level hospital 30/12/2017, ICU city hospital 1/1/2018 (severe pneumonia), Discharged 22/1/2018

### Full genome analysis based on the throat swab of the patient

BLAST result of each segment showed that all segments sharing high identity with avian influenza viruses (Table 1). It contained  $P\underline{K}G\underline{R}\downarrow G$  at the cleavage site of HA, indicating low pathogenic to poultry. Phylogenetic analysis of HA gene indicated it was distinct from the A(H7N9) virus which caused outbreaks since 2013 in China (figure 1). Internal genes are not from H9N2 virus (Table 1).

### Key molecular makers:

- ✓ Mutations that reduced sensitivity to Neuraminidase inhibitors were NOT found in this virus.
- ✓ Mutations that reduced sensitivity to amantadine and rimatadine were NOT found in this virus.
- ✓ It contained the 186G, 226Q and 228G (H3 numbering) in HA1, indicating avian-type receptor specificity.
- ✓ The sequence of patient sample carried 627K in PB2, reported as mammalian adaption. Sequence from chicken and duck samples showed E in 627 position of PB2.

### Next.....

Influenza subject matter experts evaluate novel influenza viruses based on each of these 10 criteria "low risk" scored 1-10; 1-3; "moderate risk" scored 4-7; "high risk" scored 8-10 then elements multiplied by set weightings for BOTH "Emergence" and "Impact" then graphed.


Average risk point scores and ranked weighting applied to risk scoring of influenza A(H7N9) virus isolate A/Shanghai/1/2013 for emergence and impact questions, May 2013\*

Emergence question

Impact question

		Average point scores			Average point scores
Element	Weight	May 2013	Element	Weight	May 2013
Human infections	0.2929	5.0	Disease severity	0.2929	8.5
Transmission (laboratory	0.1929	7.0	Population immunity	0.1929	9.0
animals)					
Receptor binding	0.1429	6.3	Human infections	0.1429	5.0
Population immunity	0.1096	9.0	Antivirals/treatment options	0.1096	5.8
Infections in animals	0.0846	4.7	Antigenic relationship	0.0846	3.7
Genomic variation	0.0646	8.6	Receptor binding	0.0646	6.3
Antigenic relationship	0.0479	3.7	Genomic variation	0.0479	8.6
Global distribution (animals)	0.0336	4.7	Transmission(laboratory animals)	0.0336	7.0
Disease severity	0.0211	8.5	Global distribution (animals)	0.0211	4.7
Antivirals/treatment options	0.001	5.8	Infections in animals	0.001	4.7
Weighted IRAT aggregate score	)	6.2	Weighted IRAT aggregate score		7.0

### And the output



## WHO CC's/ERL makes seed viruses against the most prevalent/concerning/different viruses currently circulating

#### H5N<sub>x</sub>

Table 4. Status of influenza A(H5) candidate vaccine virus development

Candidate vaccine viruses	Clade	Institution*	Available
A/Viet Nam/1203/2004 (CDC-RG; SJRG-161052)	1	CDC and SJCRH	Yes
A/Viet Nam/1194/2004 (NIBRG-14)	1	NIBSC	Yes
A/Cambodia/R0405050/2007 (NIBRG-88)	1.1	NIBSC	Yes
A/Cambodia/X0810301/2013 (IDCDC-RG34B)	1.1.2	CDC	Yes
A/duck/Hunan/795/2002 (SJRG-166614)	2.1.1	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/Indonesia/5/2005 (CDC-RG2)	2.1.3.2	CDC	Yes
A/Indonesia/NIHRD11771/2011 (NIIDRG-9)	2.1.3.2a	NIID	Yes
A/bar-headed goose/Qinghai/1A/2005 (SJRG-163222)	2.2	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/chicken/India/NIV33487/2006 (IBCDC-RG7)	2.2	CDC/NIV	Yes
A/whooper swan/Mongolia/244/2005 (SJRG-163243)	2.2	SJCRH	Yes
A/Egypt/2321-NAMRU3/2007 (IDCDC-RG11)	2.2.1	CDC	Yes
A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 (NIBRG-23)	2.2.1	NIBSC	Yes
A/Egypt/N03072/2010 (IDCDC-RG29)	2.2.1	CDC	Yes
A/Egypt/3300-NAMRU3/2008 (IDCDC-RG13)	2.2.1.1	CDC	Yes
A/Egypt/N04915/2014 (NIBRG-306)	2.2.1.2	NIBSC	Yes
A/common magpie/Hong Kong/5052/2007 (SJRG-166615)	2.3.2.1	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/Hubei/1/2010 (IDCDC-RG30)	2.3.2.1a	CDC	Yes
A/duck/Bangladesh/19097/2013 (SJ007)	2.3.2.1a	SJCRH	Yes
A/barn swallow/Hong Kong/D10-1161/2010 (SJ003)	2.3.2.1b	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/duck/Viet Nam/NCVD-1584/2012 (NIBRG-301)	2.3.2.1c	NIBSC	Yes
A/chicken/Hong Kong/AP156/2008 (SJ002)	2.3.4	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/Anhui/1/2005 (IBCDC-RG6)	2.3.4	CDC	Yes
A/duck/Laos/3295/2006 (CBER-RG1)	2.3.4	FDA	Yes
A/Japanese white eye/Hong Kong/1038/2006 (SJRG-164281)	2.3.4	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/chicken/Bangladesh/11rs1984-30/2011 (IDCDC-RG36)	2.3.4.2	CDC	Yes
A/Guizhou/1/2013 (IDCDC-RG35)	2.3.4.2	CDC/CCDC	Yes
A/Sichuan/26221/2014 (IDCDC-RG42A) (H5N6)	2.3.4.4	CDC/CCDC	Yes
A/Hubei/29578/2016 (H5N6)	2.3.4.4	CCDC	Yes
A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088-6/2014 (IDCDC-RG43A) (H5N8)	2.3.4.4	CDC	Yes
A/duck/Hyogo/1/2016 (NIID-001) (H5N6)	2.3.4.4	NIID	Yes
A/goose/Guiyang/337/2006 (SJRG-165396)	4	SJCRH/HKU	Yes
A/chicken/Viet Nam/NCVD-016/2008 (IDCDC-RG12)	7.1	CDC	Yes
A/chicken/Viet Nam/NCDV-03/2008 (IDCDC-RG25A)	7.1	CDC	Yes
Candidate vaccine viruses in preparation	Clade	Institution	Availability

Transfer view interfer view 2000 (ID CD C It C2011)	7.12	CDC	1 40
Candidate vaccine viruses in preparation	Clade	Institution	Availability
A/chicken/Guiyang/1153/2016	2.3.2.1c	SJCRH/HKU	Pending
A/chicken/Ghana/20/2015-like	2.3.2.1c	CDC	Pending
A/chicken/Viet Nam/NCVD-15A59/2015 (H5N6)	2.3.4.4	SJCRH	Pending
A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017-like (H5N6)	2.3.4.4	CCDC	Pending
A/environment/Hubei/950/2013	7.2	CDC/CCDC	Pending

NIBSC - National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, a centre of the Medicines and Healthcare

CDC - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States of America

NIV - National Institute of Virology, India

CCDC - Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

FDA - Food and Drug Administration, United States of America

HKU - University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China.

products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), United Kingdom

NIID - National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan

SJCRH - St Jude Children's Research Hospital, United States of America

#### **H7N9**

Table 5. Status of influenza A(H7N9) candidate vaccine virus development

Candidate vaccine virus	Type	Institution*	Available
IDCDC-RG33A (A/Anhui/1/2013)	Reverse genetics	CDC	Yes
NIBRG-268 (A/Anhui/1/2013)	Reverse genetics	NIBSC	Yes
NIIDRG-10.1 (A/Anhui/1/2013)	Reverse genetics	NIID	Yes
SJ005 (A/Anhui/1/2013)	Reverse genetics	SJCRH	Yes
NIBRG-267 (A/Shanghai/2/2013)	Reverse genetics	NIBSC	Yes
CBER-RG4A (A/Shanghai/2/2013)	Reverse genetics	FDA	Yes
IDCDC-RG32A (A/Shanghai/2/2013)	Reverse genetics	CDC	Yes
IDCDC-RG32A.3 (A/Shanghai/2/2013)	Reverse genetics	CDC	Yes
IDCDC-RG56B (A/Hong Kong/125/2017-like)	Reverse genetics	CDC	Yes
CNIC-GD003 (A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016-like)	Reverse genetics	CCDC	Yes
IDCDC-RG56N (A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016-like)	Reverse genetics	CDC	Yes
NIBRG-375 (A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016-like)	Reverse genetics	NIBSC	Yes
CBER-RG7C (A/Guangdong/17SF003/2016-like)	Reverse genetics	FDA	Yes
CNIC-HN02650 (A/Hunan/02650/2016-like)	Reverse genetics	CCDC	Yes

#### H7N<sub>x</sub>

Table 6. Status of influenza A(H7) candidate vaccine virus development (excluding A(H7N9))

Those of Status of Military candidate (according 11(11/15))					
Candidate vaccine virus	Subtype	Type	Institution*	Available	
A/mallard/Netherlands/12/2000 (NIBRG-63)	H7N1	Reverse genetics	NIBSC	Yes	
A/turkey/Italy/3889/99	H7N1	Wild type	NIBSC	Yes	
A/turkey/Virginia/4529/2002 (IBCDC-5)	H7N2	Reverse genetics	CDC	Yes	
A/New York/107/2003 (NIBRG-109)	H7N2	Reverse genetics	NIBSC	Yes	
A/Canada/rv444/2004 (SJRG-161984)	H7N3	Reverse genetics	SJCRH	Yes	
A/mallard/Netherlands/12/2000 (NIBRG-60)	H7N3	Reverse genetics	NIBSC	Yes	
A/mallard/Netherlands/12/2000 (IBCDC-1)	H7N7	Conventional	CDC	Yes	

#### **H9**

Table 7. Status of influenza A(H9N2) candidate vaccine virus development


Table 7: Status of influenza 21(115112) candidate vaccine virus development						
Candidate vaccine viruses	Type	Clade	Institution*	Available		
A/Hong Kong/1073/99	Wild type	G1	NIBSC	Yes		
A/chicken/Hong Kong/G9/97 (NIBRG-91)	Reverse genetics	Y280/G9	NIBSC	Yes		
A/chicken/Hong Kong/G9/97 (IBCDC-2)	Conventional	Y280/G9	CDC	Yes		
A/Hong Kong/33982/2009 (IDCDC-RG26)	Reverse genetics	G1	CDC	Yes		
A/Bangladesh/994/2011 (IDCDC-RG31)	Reverse genetics	G1	CDC	Yes		
A/Hong Kong/308/2014 (SJ008)	Reverse genetics	Y280/G9	SJCRH	Yes		

http://www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/virus/201802\_zoonotic vaccinevirusupdate.pdf?ua=1

<sup>\*</sup> Institutions developing and/or distributing the candidate vaccine viruses:

### Global interconnectivity in 21st Century – airline routes







#### BMJ. 2010 May 21;340:c2424. doi: 10.1136/bmj.c2424.

Transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza on passenger aircraft: retrospective cohort study. Baker MG, Thornley CN, Mills C, Roberts S, Perera S, Peters J, Kelso A, Barr I, Wilson N.

### **Swine H1N1 human pandemic in 2009**





The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which

P Data Source: World Health Organization Map Production: Public Health Information and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) World Health Organization

Map produced: 01 June 2009 06:46 GMT

### Summary

- The source and subtype of the next pandemic influenza virus is unknown
- At this point in time:
  - H5Nx viruses are still prevalent in wild birds, less so in poultry, even less so in humans
  - H7N9 viruses in man and poultry in China are vastly reduced in 2017-8 vs 2016-7
  - Swine viruses (eg H1N1v, H1N2v, H3N2v) cases persist in USA (+ elsewhere) but reduced
- But.....
  - Avian influenza viruses are still quite prevalent
  - Avian surveillance (especially poultry) is heavily focused on HPAI viruses
  - Influenza surveillance in swine is very limited (USA/Europe)
  - Extensive reassorting of viruses occurs at all interfaces b/w av/av, sw/sw, av/sw, sw/human
  - A small number of amino acid changes (HA/NA/PB2) can change transmission efficiency
- Evaluation tools, animal models and NGS give us insights into novel viruses
  - CDC IRAT and WHO TIPRA "rank" potential pandemic viruses by "emergence" & "severity"
  - WHO has a bank of seed viruses prepared that can be rapidly used for vaccine production
  - WHO has developed a series of processes for use in a pandemic eg PISA, PIRM etc.
- Need to remain flexible
  - May get another 2009 pandemic (mild) or a more severe pandemic (1968, moderate)
  - Source wont matter once the pandemic occurs but can try to reduce current potential sources

### Updated and new WHO pandemic documents



LIST INCLUDED THE COLUMN A checklist for pandemic influenza risk and impact management Divibility councity for Derrodamic a expension

Jan 2018






Mar 2017



Mar 2018



May 2017



Yes, you can clap now!!

